On September 18, 2026, the Seventh Circuit delivered a significant victory for employers in Hamada v. Laborforce, LLC, Case No. 25-3110 (7th Cir. Sept. 18, 2026), the court’s first National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) injunction case since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339 (2024).
Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act allows the NLRB to seek temporary injunctions in federal court while underlying administrative proceedings remain pending. Traditionally, the NLRB has relied on these injunctions to obtain immediate relief, such as bargaining orders or reinstatement of employees, before it issues a final decision. A unanimous Supreme Court in Starbucks held that federal courts must apply the traditional four-factor test when considering the NLRB’s request for a preliminary injunction under Section 10(j). Under this test, the NLRB “must make a clear showing” of each of the following factors:
- a likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying unfair labor practice charge;
- that irreparable harm will likely ensue in the absence of preliminary relief;
- the balance of equities justifies an injunction; and
- an injunction is in the public interest.
Relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Starbucks, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that Section 10(j) injunctions are “extraordinary” remedies and are “never awarded as of right.” While the NLRB must meet all four factors, the Seventh Circuit described proving irreparable harm as a “threshold requirement.”
In Laborforce, the Seventh Circuit found that the NLRB had failed to establish irreparable harm. Significantly, the court rejected the notion that generic claims about erosion of union support among employees and deprivation of the benefits of collective bargaining and union representation automatically establish irreparable harm. Instead, the court held that the NLRB must (1) identify a specific injury to rights protected by the NLRA, (2) establish the injury is likely to result without an injunction and (3) explain why the NLRB’s eventual remedies could not repair the harm.
Further, the court found that the NLRB waited too long to seek injunctive relief. The NLRB often waits to seek injunctive relief until after the administrative law judge (ALJ) hearing and sometimes not until the ALJ reaches a decision. In Laborforce, although the union had requested Section 10(j) relief early in the dispute, the NLRB did not file for an injunction until after the ALJ hearing had closed, 18 months after the union filed its first charge and seven months after the NLRB issued a complaint. The Seventh Circuit viewed that delay as inconsistent with the urgency typically associated with extraordinary equitable relief. By requiring the NLRB to make a specific and persuasive showing of irreparable harm and by treating delay as a meaningful factor in the analysis, the court has reinforced that Section 10(j) injunctions remain an extraordinary remedy, not a routine litigation tool.
